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Keeley: Substantive and Procedural Aspects of the Right to Effective Assi

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
In an earlier era trial courts perceived their responsibility regarding the quality of legal assistance to be limited to the appointment of reputable counsel. Unless the circumstances were exceptional, judges confronted with a lack of adequate representation for
a defendant "papered over" the problem either because they
feared a flood of frivolous claims or because they were reluctant to
upset the finality of criminal convictions.' Even today, when a
growing number of courts have formulated a more stringent sixth
amendment standard for judging counsel effectiveness, there remains a judicial reluctance to recognize the fundamental nature of
the right to effective assistance of counsel.' This reluctance results
not from an inarticulated suspicion that "all defendants are guilty
anyway," but from conflicting policy interests at work in the criminal justice system.3 Courts today attempt to balance the constitutional mandate for effective defense counsel against an institutional desire to preserve the finality of criminal litigation. Consequently, the law surrounding effectiveness of counsel lacks clear
standards and uniform enforcement. 4
This Note will consider the constitutional nature of the standard for judging ineffectiveness that is applied by a majority of the
federal courts and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
It will also survey the various types of claims of ineffectiveness
considered by the West Virginia court and the procedural setting
in which they arise. Finally, the Note will analyze the major procedural aspects of appellate review and their substantive effect on
claims of ineffectiveness.
I See Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representationin Criminal bases: Departures From Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 929 (1973).
2 "Recent extensions of Sixth Amendment doctrine give calculating defen-

dants the opportunity to divert attention from fundamental issues of guilt and
innocence by channeling judicial resources into the resolution of nice questions of
legal competence." Carter v. Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711, 716 n.1 (W. Va. 1976).
But see McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 785 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Trainingand Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FoRrHAm L. REV. 227,

233 (1973).
1 Tests of ineffectiveness are usually not drawn narrowly enough to provide
guidelines in any meaningful sense; and courts use their tests more to rationalize
the result than to provide the basis for it. See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideonand
Argersinger, 64 GEO. L. J. 811, 818 (1976).
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I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT STANDARD OF EFFECTIVENESS
Although in Powell v. Alabama the United States Supreme
Court first recognized that the right to counsel includes the right

to the effective aid of counsel,5 the Court failed to define the meaning of effective aid. As appeals proliferated in the wake of Powell,
the lower courts, fearing the impact a literal interpretation could
have on the adversary system,' severely restricted the scope of
judicial scrutiny by rooting the right to effective representation in
the fair trial requirement of the due process clause and not in the
sixth amendment. 7 Under this standard, ineffectiveness existed
only when defense counsel's assistance was so perfunctory or so

outrageous that it rendered the entire trial a "mockery of justice".'
It was not until Gideon v. Wainwright made the sixth amendment directly applicable to the states9 that any serious reevaluation of the character and quality of defense counsel representation
occurred. Gideon established that the sixth amendment right to
counsel is a fundamental right and not merely an aspect of due
process."' Jurists and commentators thus inferred from Gideon a

3 287 U.S. 45 (1932). While the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, it is not clear from the language of the Constitution
that the right to effective assistance is a necessary qualification of the right to
counsel. The sixth amendment merely states that "[in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6 See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 358
U.S. 850 (1958). In the opinion Judge Prettyman forcefully argued that the Supreme Court in Powell had "never used the term ('effective') to refer to the quality
of service rendered by a lawyer" so long as an operative appointment of counsel had
been made.
I See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945); Owens v. King, 149 W. Va. 637, 142 S.E.2d 880 (1965).
1 Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir. 1965). This test required such a
minimal level of performance that lawyers who appeared in court drunk or who fell
asleep during trial were found to have rendered assistance sufficient under the
Constitution. See Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962, 967-68 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 617 (1941); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970)
(on appeal the attorney attacked his own trial performance).
For a full discussion of the mockery of justice standard of ineffectiveness see
Note, Ineffective Representationas a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles
for Appellate Review, 13 COL. J.L. Soc. PROB. 1, 24-36 (1977).
' 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which
had held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not encompass the sixth amendment right to appointed counsel).
1*See Bines, supra note 1, at 935-36 & n.47. Post-Gideon cases have established a defendant's right to the services of an attorney at all "critical stages" of
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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
caveat to tighten standards of performance."
Notwithstanding Gideon's implications about the importance
of a lawyer's services, broad philosophical questions about the finality of criminal trials and judicial resistance to attacks on the
bar made most courts hesitant to discard the mockery of justice
standard.'" Thus the major impetus toward a more stringent sixth
amendment standard of review of attorney competency did not
occur until the Supreme Court implicitly invalidated the farce
the proceedings. For a historical perspective of this development see Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S..353 (1963) (representation required on appeal); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (representation required at interrogation); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (representation required at every critical stage of a
prosecution); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (representation required at juvenile
proceedings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (representation required
at line-ups); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (representation required at
preliminary hearings); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (representation
required in all cases involving possible imprisonment). But see Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no requirement of representation at all parole and probation
revocation hearings).
" See Bines, supra note 1; Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 1077 (1973); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-ConvictionRelief in CriminalCases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rv. 289 (1964).
Since the right to counsel was constitutionally grounded in the sixth amendment,
it was viewed as having a meaning more specific than the general ambit of due
process and as demanding a stricter, more meaningful standard for judging attorney
competency than the mockery of justice test. One court, prior to Gideon, had
interpreted the sixth amendment right to counsel to be the right to effective counsel
and incorporated a standard requiring counsel assistance "reasonably likely to
render and renderingreasonably effective assistance." MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d
592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), order modified, 289 F.2d 928, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877
(1961). MacKenna, however, did not intend to establish a new standard of review
of ineffectiveness cases.
22 See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in
Transition, 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 509, 511-13 n.15 (1976). The concept of finality
applies chiefly to convictions attacked collaterally on habeas corpud, which is the
way the bulk of ineffectiveness claims are raised. Some courts have distinguished
between claibs raised on direct appeal and claims raised collaterally, exhibiting a
greater willingness to reverse when the case is before them on direct appeal because
the concept of finality has not yet attached to the conviction. Garton v. Swenson,
497 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1974). This distinction is questionable, however, since the
issue of ineffectiveness involves a constitutional claim and "conventional notions
of finality have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (Brennan,
J.). In United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court
implied that the distinction between claims raised collaterally and on direct
appeal had been erased by the imposition of the sixth amendment requirements in
ineffectiveness cases.
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standard of review in McMann v. Richardson.'3 In McMann the
Court held that guilty pleas made in open court by a competently
represented defendant are unassailable." In so deciding, the Court
addressed the general standard of competency that should be required of an attorney who advises his client to plead guilty. After
initially recognizing that all defendants are entitled to the effective
assistance of competent counsel, the Court observed that the advice rendered by an attorney as to whether a confession would be
admissible in evidence should be "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."' 5 This discussion in
McMann was dictum and aside from emphasizing that judges
should require a standard of performance which would guarantee
defendants their constitutional right to counsel, 6 it added little
substance and meaning to the constitutional concept of effectiveness. 7 Nevertheless, because many lower courts had been groping
for the correct prescription to apply in claims alleging ineffective
counsel, they adopted McMann's language, minimal as it was, as
their general test for judging such claims.'"
II.

STANDARD OF REvIEw

AFTER McMann

Although a majority of the federal courts of appeals now require that defense counsel meet some derivative of the McMann
"reasonable competency" test,'9 these standards are confusingly
,3 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
" Id. at 771.

,Id.
"[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and...
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who
are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts." Id.
"1See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1973) where the Court

reiterated the standard in McMann and held that mere errors in evaluating facts
or predicting how courts will rule do not establish that a defendant received constitutionally defective assistance. See generally, Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel: The
Emerging Fair TrialIssue for the Seventies? 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 19 (1975).
, See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
Only the Second and the Tenth Circuits continue to apply the farce or
mockery of justice test. See United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 909 (1977) (cross-examination alleged to be inadequate, but coun-

sel challenged witnesses' identification of defendant and other testimony; representation adequate under farce and mockery test); Rickenbacker v. Warden, Auburn
Correctional Facility, 550 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977)
(counsel made no opening statement and failed to object to inadmissible evidence;
representation adequate under farce and mockery standard); Gillihan v. Rodriguez,

551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977) (counsel failed to make various pretrial motions and
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imprecise and cases within the same circuit may frequently disagree about the appropriate language to employ. The Third and
Seventh Circuits apply versions of a malpractice standard of ordinary skill and care in the community. 20 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits each apply a variant of the "reasonable lawyer" standard of
competency originally formulated by the Fifth Circuit in
MacKenna v. Ellis.2' The Eighth Circuit, although it purports to
follow the malpractice standard adopted by the Third and Seventh
Circuits, continues to use the mockery of justice standard as an
indicator of the defendant's heavy burden of proof in ineffectiveness cases.22 The First and Ninth Circuits conflict within themmade uncontested change in defense theory; representation adequate under the
farce and mockery standard); United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir.
1976) (failure to call certain witnesses, to introduce certain testimony and to request information not grounds for reversal).
" In Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970), the Third Circuit
stated that counsel's overall conduct during preparation and investigation as well
as during trial should be of such a quality as to equal "the customary skill and
knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place." In United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975),
the Seventh Circuit stated that the sixth and fourteenth amendments guarantee
a criminal defendant legal assistance which meets a "minimum standard of professional representation." See also Spencer v. Warden, Pontiac Correctional
Center, 545 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1976) (representation inadequate under minimum
standards test because counsel was concededly unprepared, was appointed late,
made no opening statement, called no witnesses, and conducted ineffective crossexamination).
21 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), order modified, 289 F.2d 928, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 877 (1961). See note 11 supra. In Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 127 (5th
Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit awkwardly integrated the reasonable lawyer standard
of MacKenna into a long-standing series of decisions upholding the mockery of
justice standard: "One method of determining whether counsel has rendered reasonably effective assistance is to ask whether the proceedings were a farce or mockery. The farce-mockery test is but one criterion for determining if an accused has
received the constitutionally required minimum representation (rebsonably effective assistance)." See also United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976).
In Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974), the Sixth Circuit
formally adopted the MacKenna standard but referred additionally to McMann v.
Richardson, holding that reasonable counsel must perform at least as well as a
lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law.
22 In United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth
Circuit followed the malpractice standard adopted by the Third and Seventh Circuits, but stated additionally that when counsel fails to satisfy his duty to be
reasonably competent, the proceedings may be said to have been reduced to a farce
and mockery of justice. Easteralso lacks clarity because the court refused to reconsider its unique use of the mockery of justice standard as an indicator of the defendant's heavy burden of proof adopted in its earlier decision in McQueen v. Swenson,
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selves as to the proper standard of effectiveness and have applied
both sixth amendment and mockery of justice rationales in recent
cases. 23 The District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits have
adopted the single-phrase McMann formulation and, in addition,
have enumerated guidelines considered relevant to the development of a clearer concept of counsel effectiveness.Y
More than half of the state supreme courts have also adopted
a "reasonableness" test for measuring effective assistance of counsel.2 5 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did so in State
v. Thomas. 2 Stating that the right to effective representation was
498 F.2d 207, 215 (8th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 77-91, infra, for a
discussion of the problem of burden of proof in ineffectiveness cases.
The First Circuit recently applied a modified community standard test in
Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003
(1975), and a farce and mockery of justice test in United States v. Ramirez, 535
F.2d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1976). In Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir.
1977), the Ninth Circuit applied the reasonableness test of the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits. In Greenfield v. Gunn, 558 F.2d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 1977), however, the
court acknowledged that three alternative standards are available in the circuit:
farce or mockery, denial of fundamental fairness, and lack of reasonable counsel.
Other decisions acknowledging the availability of several standards in the Ninth
Circuit are United States v. Lemon, 550 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1977) and de
Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075
(1977).
2 In United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the
District of Columbia Circuit articulated a shorthand reasonable lawyer test and
pointed out guidelines considered relevant to developing the meaning of counsel
effectiveness. Under these guidelines defense counsel is required to confer with and
advise his client, protect the rights of the client, and conduct appropriate factual
and legal investigations. The court stressed that these guidelines were only a starting point for courts and lawyers to develop a clearer concept. See Bazelon, supra
note 4, at 823-24, for a discussion of these guidelines.
In Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting; see note 123 infra), the Fourth Circuit
incorporated within its standard the enumeration of duties that it had previously
adopted in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968). The court characterized this standard as "necessarily broad and flexible,"
and, reflecting the DeCoster view, stated that trial judges "may refer to other
sources to determine the normal competency of the bar." These other sources,
according to the court, included precedent from state and federal courts, state bar
canons, the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function, and "in some instances, expert testimony on the particular conduct at issue." Marzullo's dictates have
been followed in Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978) and Fuller v.
Luther, 575 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1978).
25 See Bazelon, supra note 4, at 820.
26 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
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"logically compelled" by the right to counsel, 27 it adopted as its
test "whether [counsel] exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law."18Although Thomas did not specifically mention the fact, its standard is clearly derived from the language
29
found in McMann v. Richardson.
The West Virginia rule effectively broadens the court's focus
beyond the trial proceedings themselves and includes a critical
appraisal of the entire defense function. 0 It does not, however,
stipulate any specific guidelines for measuring counsel adequacy,
thus leaving trial courts and attorneys to their own perceptions of
3
what effective representation requires.
Prior to its decision in Thomas, the West Virginia court had
only once alluded to ineffectiveness of counsel as a basis for rever" The court found the right guaranteed by W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14 and the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. See State ex rel. May v. Boles,
149 W. Va. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177 (1964). But the right to effective assistance of
counsel on appeal is guaranteed through the due process clause of W. VA. CONST.
art. 3, § 10. See Rhodes v. Leverette, 235 S.E.2d 136, 140 (W. Va. 1977).
203 S.E.2d at 461.
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
See Carter v. Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711, 715 (W. Va. 1976), where the
court quoted from Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 739 (3d Cir. 1970):
"[R]epresentation involves more than the courtroom conduct of the advocate. The
exercise of the utmost skill during the trial is not enough if counsel has neglected
the necessary investigation and preparation of the case or failed to interview essential witnesses or to arrange for their attendance."
' Precisely because it requires no guidelines, the West Virginia test arguably
sets a lower standard of scrutiny than that of the Fourth Circuit. This disparity
could result in friction and confusion whenever a petitioner convicted by a West
Virginia court exhausts his state remedies and seeks federal habeas corpus relief.
Although it has not addressed this issue, the West Virginia court might conceivably
be willing to adopt the Fourth Circuit's Marzullo guidelines. In Housden v. Leverette, 241 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1978), for example, it adopted the Fourth Circuit's
presumption of ineffectiveness when there is less than a one-day interval between
the appointment of counsel and trial or the entry of a guilty plea. In so doing the
court stated,
"[Elfficient administration and utilization of judicial time provide an
additional policy consideration for adopting the approach employed by
the Fourth Circuit, since after a prisoner of this state exhausts his state
post-conviction remedies, he may, and often does, pursue relief in the
federal district courts of this state. .. "
241 S.E.2d at 812. Admittedly, the court characterized the one-day interval rule as
"procedural," but its basic rationale could be applied to the disparity in the substantive standards of review as well.
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sal of a defendant's conviction. " Since Thomas, the court has ac-

knowledged ineffectiveness as a basis for possible relief in numerous cases.3
III.

CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION

Although the standards of review applied by many courts are
disparate and lack clarity, claims of ineffective assistance have
proliferated as prisoners have realized that the sixth amendment
entitles them to broader opportunities to present successful
claims.? Because the defendant's right to effective assistance at'
taches before trial and extends through post-trial proceedings, 3
2

In State ex reL. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 473,

63 S.E.2d 845 (1951), the court reversed a conviction because counsel had been
denied a continuance in order to prepare for the case to which he had been ap.
pointed less than 24 hours before. The court did express concern that denial of the
right to prepare violated defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. "To
hold that counsel should have prepared for trial in less than twenty-four hours after
having been employed would, we think, have the effect of denying the defendants
a fair trial, and denying unto them the effective assistance of counsel to which they
were entitled." 135 W. Va. at 483, 63 S.E.2d at'851.
3 See Housden v. Leverette, 241 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1978) (claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel sustained where there was only a one-day interval between
appointment of counsel and entry of guilty plea); State v. Pratt, 244 S.E.2d 227
(W. Va. 1978) (trial court held responsible for preventing oppressive overmatch
between prosecutor and defense counsel); Cannellas v. McKenzie, 236 S.E.2d 327
(W. Va. 1977) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel sustained where cumulative effect of numerous instances of trial error is grounds to infer that petitioner did
not have a fair trial); Watson v. Black, 239 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1977) (although
there are circumstances mandating appointment of new counsel, claims of ineffective assistance rejected where competent counsel appointed and accused did not
exert good faith effort to get along with him); State ex rel. Postelwaite v. Bechtold,
212 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va. 1975) (claim of ineffective assistance rejected where petitioner did not demonstrate actual conflict of interest in joint representation). Cf.
State ex reL. Wine v. Bordenkircher, 230 S.E.2d 747 (W. Va. 1976) (counsel's efforts
so inadequate as to render the trial a farce and a mockery of justice). The confusion
generated by Wine was put to rest in Cannellas, 236 S.E.2d at 331.
1 The sizeable increase in the number of ineffectiveness claims can also be
attributed, in part, to the expansion of the procedural device of collateral attack.
In 1963 the Supreme Court undertook a major reevaluation of postconviction attacks on state convictions, by way of extending federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
to claims not knowingly waived which would otherwise be barred by state procedural rules. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The liberalization of remedies effected
by Fay combined with the expansion of sixth amendment rights precipitated the
large growth in the number of ineffectiveness claims. See notes 112-19 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of recent constrictions in the use of federal
habeas by the Supreme Court.
" See Wood v. Zahradnick, 578 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1978) (right to reasonably
effective counsel attaches when lawyer appointed) and United States v. Pinkney,

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol81/iss3/11

8

Keeley: Substantive and Procedural Aspects of the Right to Effective Assi

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
the task of measuring individual effectiveness encompasses many
* different factual situations.36 Federal courts have thus been pre551 F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (ineffectiveness inquiry applied to sentencing proceedings).
" Courts have previously distinguished not only between different factual situations to analyze ineffectiveness, but also between counsel's status as assigned or
retained. Two reasons have usually been advanced for this distinction: (1) counsel
was the employed agent of the accused who was thus bound by his agent's actions;
or (2) the fourteenth amendment is directed to state action, and state action is not
involved when counsel is retained. Both the distinction and its reasons have been
rejected by the commentators and a majority of the courts. See, e.g., Tolliver v.
United States, 563 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1977); Crimson v. United States, 510 F.2d
356 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973); Moore
v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970); U.S. ex rel. Castleberry v. Sielaff,
446 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Waltz, supra note 14 at 296-301; 26 A.L.R. Fed.
218, 236-39 (1976). The New York court has labelled as "strained" the distinction
between appointed and retained counsel: "To presume that a defendant represented by retained counsel has the capability to discern during the course of the
trial that his legal representation is ineffective, let alone exert meaningful control
over counsel's conduct, is . . . unwarranted, either in theory or practice." People
v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 276 (N.Y. 1978).
One federal court, however, has developed a bifurcated approach to the status
of counsel in an ineffectiveness inquiry. In Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th
Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit distinguished between actual state responsibility for
the conduct of appointed counsel compared to private counsel and held that its
sixth amendment standard of the reasonably effective lawyer, see note 21 supra and
accompanying text, more strictly applied to protect indigent defendants. A defendant who retained his own counsel would have to show either (1) that his lawyer's
ineffectiveness made the trial fundamentally unfair-in effect adopting the mockery of justice standard for retained counsel-or (2) that the ineffectiveness at least
fell below the reasonably effective standard and that a "responsible state official"
participating in the trial knew or should have known of the situation and failed to
act. 505 F.2d at 1335-38.
The basic requirement that a defendant who hires his own counsel must show
requisite "state action" under the fourteenth amendment before ineffectiveness will
be found underestimates the pervasiveness of the state's involvement in the criminal process. See Judge Godbold's dissent in Fitzgeraldv. Estelle: "From arrest to
ultimate release, and even afterwards on probation or parole, the accused is at least
to some degree in the hands of this system. The lawyer, appointed or retained, is a
crucial part of the adjudicatory machinery.

.

. ."

Id. at 1345.

For cases invoking the dual standard from Fitzgeraldv. Estelle, see Loftis v.
Estelle, 515 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975) (where, in prosecution for possession of narcotics, counsel failed to secure continuance, failed to get petitioner's case severed from
that of a codefendant who had pled guilty before the same jury and who had
suffered withdrawal symptoms while in court in the jury's presence, and failed to
object to the admission of petitioner's confession and of narcotics seized during a
search of his home, ineffectiveness not so blatant that the prosecution or trial judge
or both should have recognized that the defendant was not receiving effective representation from his privately retained attorney); United States ex rel. Reis v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (trial strategy of private attorney did
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sented with claims asserting a variety of pretrial, trial, and posttrial errors.Y Claims in West Virginia are similarly varied.
1. PretrialErrors. In West Virginia the effect of a late appointment of counsel is a well-established ground for asserting
ineffective representation.3 8 Although the court had previously rejected any per se rule about what constituted sufficient preparation time, Housden v. Leverette held that an interval of one day
or less between the appointment of counsel and trial or between
the appointment of counsel and the entry of a guilty plea raises a
rebuttable presumption of ineffectiveness.3 9 In Carter v.
Bordenkircherthe court stated that the failure of counsel to investigate a material element of a client's defense can constitute ineffectiveness, although it held that in the case before it counsel's
failure to subpoena the defendant's work record did not amount to
ineffective assistance because "in the practice of criminal law it is
not always possible for a lawyer to investigate every avenue suggested to him by his client" and because the other evidence against
the defendant was overwhelming. 0
not deprive petitioner's trial of fundamental fairness and was not so apparent that
a reasonably attentive state official should have interceded to take corrective action).
West Virginia has never distinguished between appointed and retained counsel.
Assertions of pretrial error commonly include an attorney's misadvice to his
client to plead guilty, counsel's lack of preparation because of late appointment,
and attorney failure to adequately investigate all the facts and relevant law. Assertions of trial error commonly include counsel's failure to put a witness or the
defendant on the stand, failure to raise an available defense, failure to object to
evidence, incompetent cross-examination, failure to make adequate closing arguments and failure to request or object to instructions. Assertions of post-trial error
commonly include counsel's failure to inform his client about his right to appeal or
about his right to perfect a requested appeal. Note, Ineffective Representationas a
Basis for Relief from Conviction: PrinciplesforAppellate Review, 13 COL. J.L. Soc.
PRo. 1, 8-15 (1977).
1 In Wilhelm v. Whyte, 239 S.E.2d 735 (W. Va. 1977), the court recognized a
constitutional basis independent of due process for the right to a continuance if a
defendant is not accorded a reasonable time to prepare. The accused "shall have
the assistance of counsel, and a reasonable time to prepare for his defense." W. VA.
CONST. art. 3, § 14. See also the discussion of State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 473, 63 S.E.2d 845 (1951), note 32 supra, and State v.
Tapp, 153 W. Va. 759, 172 S.E.2d 583 (1970) (had counsel alleged he was unprepared because of late appointment, the trial court's denial of a motion for a continuance might have constituted prejudicial error).
" 241 S.E.2d 810, 811 (W. Va. 1978) (adopting the rule of the Fourth Circuit).
See note 31, supra.
10 226 S.E.2d 711, 715 (W. Va. 1976).
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2. Trial Errors. Trial counsel's courtroom performance is the
most frequently litigated issue in ineffectiveness cases, and it is the
most difficult to judge. Error-free representation is an impossibly
high standard to meet, and what in hindsight looks like error may
have seemed a wise choice of strategy before trial. On the other
hand,.not every apparent error is the result of defensible strategy.
Thus the West Virginia court has attempted to dittinguish gross
error from acceptable professional mistake in determining whether
to grdnt or deny relief.4 In State v. Thomas the court expressed a
general reluctance to second-guess an attorney's trial tactics on the
theory that actions which appear erroneous in hindsight may have
been supported by sound reasons at the time of trial. The court
held that where counsel's allegedly ineffective performance arises
from occurrences involving strategy, tactics, and arguable courses
of action, his conduct will be deemed effective unless no reasonably
qualified defense attorney would have so acted.42 In Carter v.
Bordenkircherthe court stated that counsel's failure to anticipate
every avenue of impeachment of witnesses on cross-examination
did not amount to ineffectiveness.43
In State v. Thomas, however, the court considered counsel's
trial errors to be so egregious that the integrity of the trial process
itself had been brought into question. The defendant's conviction
was reversed on the grounds that his constitutional guarantee had
been violated by tactics so substandard that no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted.44 Trial counsel's derelictions were described as: (1) failure to move for the suppression of
evidence seized incident to an unlawful arrest; (2) failure to object
to the introduction of evidence of collateral crimes in a manner
prejudicial to the accused; (3) failure to move for a directed verdict
at the close of the state's evidence; (4) failure to assign grounds in
a motion to set aside the verdict and award the defendant a new
trial; and (5) failure to file an appeal on behalf of the defendant
within the time limits prescribed by law. Additionally, defense
counsel inadvertently corroborated the state's case and aided in
1 The Supreme Court is relying increasingly on competent representation to
deny prisoners collateral review of their claims. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 266-67 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970). Thus funda-

mental questions about the efficacy of the trial tactics exception have been raised.
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117-118 (1977) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting). See also text accompanying note 122, infra.
42203 S.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974).
226 S.E.2d 711, 714 (W. Va. 1977).
"

203 S.E.2d at 459.
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securing his client's conviction by conducting a demonstration
which proved that his shoe size matched the footprints found at
5
the scene of the crime.
In Cannellas v. McKenzie the court implicitly narrowed the
scope of its trial tactics exception. Although admitting that it
could cite no single instance of counsel ineffectiveness which, if
viewed alone, would have entitled petitioner to relief, the court,
nevertheless, inferred from all the errors a "substantial probability
of actual injury" to the defendant." The shortcomings of counsel
were of considerably less consequence in Cannellas than in
Thomas.47 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Justice McGraw filed a strong
dissent in which he emphasized the subjective nature of the attorney's trial decisions and worried that the court's decision would
"chill the willingness of competent attorneys to respond to the call
to represent and defend needy litigants."
In both Thomas and Cannellasthe crucial questions for review
were the same: whether there was a reasonable basis for counsel's
tactics and whether the error affected the outcome of the trial. In
Thomas the almost total lack of objection by counsel combined
with "fundamental" trial errors forced the court to conclude that
defense counsel was acting in ignorance and that pervasive ineffectiveness had deprived the defendant of a fair trial. In Cannellas,
by contrast, where the nature of the error was more speculative and
a reasonable basis for counsel's strategy arguably existed, the court
was willing to infer from the cumulative effect of each trial error a
"substantial possibility" that defendant had been harmed."
'" Id..at 453-54. The court later commented that by holding counsel's performance incompetent, it did not intend to disparage his professional qualifications in
the general practice of law. Id. at 461.
" 236 S.E.2d 327, 329, 332 (W. Va. 1977) (defendant convicted of rape denied
a fair trial because of ineffectiveness of counsel at trial and on appeal).
"1 The finding of ineffectiveness in Cannellasresulted from: (1) failure to challenge the chain of custody of the single piece of corroborating evidence; (2) failure
to move for a mistrial when prejudicial evidence of a proposed lie detector test of a
key witness came out at trial; (3) failure to question prospective jurors as to whether
they had read prejudicial articles in the newspaper; and (4) introduction of petitioner's marital status which, if introduced by the prosecution, would have been
reversible error in a rape prosecution. Id. at 330-31.
11Id. at 336. Certainly Justice McGraw's concern that the court refrain from
second-guessing attorneys' performances on appeal is well-placed, for attorneys
must know the range of discretionary tactics they will be allowed to employ at trial.
See Note, supra note 37, at 23, for some discussion of the attorneys' concerns.
11236 S.E.2d at 332. The court failed to mention whether the record indicated
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Cannellas thus indicates that, notwithstanding the language in
Thomas, the West Virginia court may be willing to characterize
tactics with which it disagrees as ineffectiveness of counsel.
3. Post-Trial Errors. West Virginia has considered whether
counsel's neglect to appeal or to perfect an appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. In Carterv. Bordenkircherappointed
counsel asserted that because of confused communication between
himself and the petitioner he was unaware that he had been appointed to perfect the appeal.-" The petitioner had also failed to
inform the court that his appeal had not been prosecuted." The
court decided that the petitioner had been denied effective assistance as a result of counsel's failure to prosecute a timely appeal,
but determined that the relief granted should not overcompensate
for the harm done. Anticipating the rule of "tailored relief"
adopted in State ex rel. Johnson v. McKenzie, 52 the court affirmed
the circuit court's decision to resentence the petitioner in order to
allow his counsel to prosecute a delayed appeal.13 "[W]here the
denial of a timely appeal was probably harmless, except in the case
of extraordinary dereliction on the part of the State, the appropriate remedy is not discharge but such remedial steps as will permit
the effective prosecution of an appeal."5 As a result of the confusion over the appointment of counsel, the court in Carter also
provided a procedural guarantee so that future indigent cases
would be timely appealed: "[W]henever counsel is appointed in
trial court for an indigent

. .

.

counsel should be informed that

he will also be responsible by separate appointment for the
appeal. .

..

"-'

In Rhodes v. Leverette the petitioner had twice been denied
if the attorney had made informed tactical judgments or had acted in ignorance of

the consequences. This inquiry would seem pertinent to a finding of whether the
attorney's actions qualified as "reasonable" under the trial tactics exception established in State v. Thomas.
226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976).

Id. at 715. Petitioner had elected, instead, to proceed with a habeas corpus
action for which he drew a sharp rebuke from the court. Id. at 716 n.1.
52 226 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976) (dealing with a situation where petitioner's
discharge is not immediate, but rather conditioned on the failure of the state to
correct the fundamental error).
226 S.E.2d at 716-17.

5' Court syllabus point 2, id. at 712-13.
Id. at court syllabus point 3. The District of Columbia Circuit, however, in
order to encourage counsel to raise the issue of ineffectiveness on direct appeal and
thus avoid the concomitant finality problems of collateral attack, has directed lower
courts to automatically appoint new counsel to prosecute the appeal. See Bazelon,
supra note 4, at 24-25.
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his right to appeal, once when the state failed to furnish a trial
transcript before the appeal period expired, and again when his
court-appointed counsel failed to perfect the appeal. Notwithstanding a finding by the court that the petitioner had, as in
Carter,neglected his responsibility to take positive action to notify
a court of his counsel's inaction, the court held that he had been
denied his right to perfect a timely appeal. 6 The defendant's delay
in informing the court of his counsel's inaction, however, did affect
57
the scope of the relief the court granted.
Once an appeal has been perfected, the quality of representation on that appeal may itself become an issue. Whether there is
a sixth amendment right to effective appellate counsel is not clear.
The United States Supreme Court, however, without making a
direct statement regarding a constitutional right to appeal, indicated in Anders v. Californiathat the right to effective counsel on
a direct appeal of right was supportable by the due process and
equal protection doctrines!5 After describing the advocate role
that appellate counsel must fill before he will be allowed to withdraw from an appeal he believes is without merit, "9 the Court in
Anders stated: "Moreover, such handling would tend to protect
counsel from the constantly increasing charge that he was ineffective and had not handled the case with that diligence to which an
indigent defendant is entitled."6
The West Virginia court relied on the Anders mandate in
Turner v. Haynes, where counsel had not perfected his client's
appeal because he did not believe the claim to be meritorious.
Stating that it'is for the judiciary to determine whether an appeal
is frivolous, the court granted relief to the petitioner.'
239 S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 145. The court fashioned relief according to State ex rel. Johnson v.
McKenzie, 226 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976) (relief will be given so as to cure the
underlying constitutional error), and the guidelines set out in Carter v. Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976) (unconditional release in a habeas corpus
proceeding only warranted where state guilty of "extraordinary dereliction"). In
Rhodes the court recognized the petitioner's failure to notify the court of counsel's
inaction as a factor tending substantially to negate any implication of extraordinary
dereliction by the state. 239 S.E.2d at 144-45.
- 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974).
" He must first file a brief referring to any matter which might arguably
support the appeal. 386 U.S. at 744.
'

10Id. at 745.

61245 S.E.2d 629, 631 (W. Va. 1978). See also Rhodes v. Leverette, 239 S.E.2d
136 (W. Va. 1977).
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4. Other Claims. Not all claims of ineffectiveness focus on
conduct at a particular stage of the criminal proceedings. Some
allege that counsel was generally incompetent or was too inexperienced to provide effective representation.2 The West Virginia
court has considered whether inexperience alone is proof of ineffectiveness. In State v. Pratt an appointed attorney had moved that
the trial court appoint additional, more experienced counsel, and
the trial court had refused. Although it did not specifically decide•
the question, the court acknowledged, by way of dictum, that trial
courts should be responsible to see that "oppression does not occur
in criminal cases because of prosecutorial overmatch with defense
counsel.""
IV.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS

Clarification of the law surrounding the right to effective
counsel is complicated by the procedural aspects involved in asserting the claim. As previously noted, countervailing philosophies
about institutional efficiency, finality of judgments, and constitutional fairness have influenced the courts in their analysis of these
claims, and the procedural rules that have developed in response
to these philosophies have had considerable substantive effect on
the development of the law of ineffectiveness. 4
1. The Harmless Error Rule. In Chapman v. California the
Supreme Court formulated a harmless error rule for errors reaching
constitutional guarantees. Under Chapman a conviction resulting
from a trial in which constitutional error was committed will be
reversed unless the government can prove beyond a reasonable
12The leading case on inexperience of trial counsel is United States ex rel.

Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975), in which the Seventh Circuit
stated that the mere inexperience of trial counsel was not, in itself, enough to
establish lack of effective assistance. Necessarily, said the court, every lawyer must
begin his career without experience, but his first case is not inevitably so illprepared or poorly presented as to justify a finding of incompetence. "Portia with-

out experience was a remarkably successful representative of Antonio." Id. at 639.
One court, however, has indicated that inexperience should be per se ineffectiveness. See Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579, 589 (N.D. Tex. 1967): "lIlt is
doubtful that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel is fairly met by using
the unassisted representation of an indigent defendant as a training method for a
neophyte lawyer."
244 S.E.2d 227, 231 (W. Va. 1978).

* See discussion of procedural issues in Note, Ineffective Representationas a
Basisfor Relief from Appellate Conviction:PrinciplesforAppellate Review, 13 CoL.
J.L. Soc. PROB. 1, 71-90 (1977).
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doubt that the error was harmless to the defendant." For purposes
of applying the rule, the Court distinguished between substantial
and nonsubstantial rights. Violations of substantial rights, that is,
those rights essential to the conduct of a fair trial, would result in
automatic reversal because of the inherent prejudice suffered by a
defendant. The right to counsel was explicitly mentioned by the
Court as a substantial right." Chapman did not indicate, however,
whether the right to effective counsel was also such a substantial
right as to require automatic reversal irrespective of any harm to
the defendant. As a consequence of this ambiguity, courts faced
with claims of ineffective counsel have split over whether the right
to effective assistance is so basic that its violation should automatically be considered prejudicial."7
Two courts have held that once ineffectiveness has been established, a conviction must be reversed without consideration of prejudice. The Sixth Circuit in Beasley v. United States implied that
the right to effective assistance of counsel is the equivalent of the
right to counsel and that no prejudice need be shown once a defendant has established his trial counsel's ineffectiveness." The Ninth
Circuit applied the same rationale in Cooper v. Fitzharris,where
it rejected the application
of harmless error tests to cases involving
69
ineffective counsel.

386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).'
Id. at 23 n.8 (dictum). The court recently reversed convictions in two right
to counsel cases without requiring any showing of prejudice. See Gedders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring) (defendant challenging
order prohibiting consultation with his lawyer need not make a preliminary showing
of prejudice); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975) (denial of opportunity
to make a summation violates the sixth amendment regardless of the strength of
the prosecutor's case).
0 Courts retaining the mockery of justice standard do not distinguish questions
of inadequacy of performance and its resulting prejudice. Under this standard, if
counsel's performance reduced the trial to a sham or a farce, courts presume the
defendant was harmed and reversal is required. Of course, under this standard
defendant has the heavy burden of showing such error that the trial was rendered
fundamentally unfair. Courts which have adopted a sixth amendment standard of
effectiveness do differentiate between the burden of proving ineffectiveness and the
burden of proving whether defendant was prejudiced as a result.
0 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (ineffectiveness arose from placing prejudicial
witness on stand, failing to obtain fingerprint test, failing to interview or call favorable witnesses, failing to inform defendant that trial judge had earlier read a prejudicial statement concerning the defendant which led to waiver of defendant's right
to trial by jury, cursory investigation of the case, and defendant's poor health prior
to trial). "Harmless error tests do not apply in regard to the deprivation of a
procedural right so fundamental as effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 696.
69551 F.2d 1162, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977).
"
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For the majority of courts, however, prejudice has emerged as
a distinct issue within the ineffectiveness inquiry. The Second, 70
Third, 7 Fourth, 72 Eighth, 73 and District of Columbia74 Circuits
have all held that the right to effective counsel is not so substantial
as to require automatic reversal under the strict Chapmanrule and
that prejudice resulting from the ineffectiveness must be shown.
West Virginia is in accord. In State v. Thomas the court stated
that unless counsel's ineffectiveness could have changed the outcome of the case, it would be treated as harmless error. 7" This
position was reaffirmed in State v. Grimmer where the court
stated: "[counsel's] mere technical errors that do not deprive or
unduly prejudice the defendant . . . will be considered harm7
less." ,

2. The Burden of Proof. Those courts which have interpreted
Chapman as requiring a showing of prejudice in order to warrant
reversal have differed significantly over which party, the government or the defendant, should bear the burden of proof with regard
to showing the prejudice.7 7 The Third Circuit requires that the
defendant carry the burden." The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, has
70 United States ex rel. Bradley v. McMann, 423 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 994 (1971).
1' United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970).
' Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
13 McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
T'United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
' State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445, 461 (W. Va. 1974).
71State v. Grimmer, 251 S.E.2d 780, 785 (W. Va. 1979).
" See Bazelon, supra note 4, at 825 n.65; and Note, Effective Assistance of
Counsel: A ConstitutionalRight in Transition,10 VAL. U.L. REv. 509,537-54 (1976).
One author argues that important as the right to effective representation may be,
it is not as fundamental as the right to counsel, and should not be regarded with
the same reverence. Ineffectiveness appears in a multiplicity of forms, some of
which are highly probable to cause prejudice but are difficult to prove, and some
in which prejudice will be apparent. Thus a per se rule may make sense for some
violations of the right to effective representation, but not for all. Failure to advise
a client of his right to appeal, note 50 supra, or late appointment of counsel, note
38 supra, are examples of cases where the likelihood of prejudice is usually overwhelming. Note, Ineffective Representationas a Basis for Relief from Conviction:
Principlesfor Appellate Review, 13 COL. J.L. Soc. PROB. 1, 76-77 (1977). Also see
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), notes 92-104 infra, and accompanying
text, where pervasive ineffectiveness was presumed from the denial to grant a
hearing to remove counsel with a conflict of interest.
70 Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970). Cf. United States
ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1979) (burden to show prejudice excused when pervasiveness of ineffectiveness makes prejudice impossible to
determine).
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held that a showing of ineffectiveness creates a prima facie case of
prejudice unless the prosecution can establish that the defendant
was not thereby prejudiced. 9 The District of Columbia Circuit has
adopted a formulation which assertedly shifts the burden to the
prosecution. "" In fact, however, the burden seldom shifts because
the court initially requires the defendant to prove that counsel's
ineffectiveness was "substantial," that is, that it impaired the
defense."' Under this formulation it is difficult to distinguish proof
of a substantial violation of ineffectiveness from proof of prejudice.2 Obviously, the court's intention is to ensure that relief is not
granted merely for theoretical flaws.
The Eighth Circuit in a unique approach looks at the exigencies of each case and allocates the burden of proof accordingly.,,
In McQueen v. Swenson the court stated that the petitioner must
shoulder the initial burden of either showing the existence of evidence which could have been uncovered by reasonable investigation and which would have proved helpful to the defendant at the
original trial, or of demonstrating that changed circumstances beyond his control make it impossible to produce that evidence. " If
11Coles

v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226-27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849

(1968).

United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (the court held
that failure to dispute government allocution memorandum used in a sentencing
hearing was inconsequential in light of the facts presented); Moore v. United
States, 554 F.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (absent a showing of adverse consequences, the failure of counsel to investigate an alleged love affair between the
defendant's wife and a key prosecution witness could not be regarded as substantial). But see Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1978) (prejudice as a matter of
law where counsel failed to object to testimony regarding prisoner's silence at time
of his arrest).
" See Bazelon, supra note 4, at 825 n.65: "DeCoster, I have come to realize,
makes the same mistake, (blurring the issue of ineffectiveness with the question of
prejudice) by stating that if 'a defendant shows a substantial violation . . .he has
been denied effective representation unless the government . . . can establish a
lack of prejudice thereby.' "In United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir.,
Oct. 19, 1976) (opinion following remand) (reargued May 26, 1977), the court created a presumption that counsel's failure to investigate constituted a substantial
constitutional violation. The court, however, refused to grant automatic reversal,
adopting instead the Chapman harmless error analysis. "[W]e distinguish between the question of whether counsel's violations were consequential, i.e., impaired the defense, and the question of whether the impairment was harmful, i.e.,
affected the outcome." Id. at 21 n.32.
4 See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
867 (1976).
498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
R,
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the evidence is shown, a new trial is warranted unless the court is
able to declare that its omission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. If circumstances are shown to have changed, then the burden of showing the absence of prejudice shifts to the state.,
The West Virginia court has discussed the issue of burden of
proof in apparently conflicting language. On the one hand, State
v. Thomas indicates that the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the ineffectiveness resulted in his conviction.86 This requirement seems to be the equivalent of a showing
by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence that the error
was not harmless. Yet State v. Thomas also considers effective
assistance to be a constitutional right, and asserts the Chapman
principle that where there is constitutional error, the conviction
must fall unless the state shows that the error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."7 Since both formulations appear in the same
opinion, it is difficult to ascertain the court's precise intent. The
court is dealing with what it has asserted to be a constitutional
right, so perhaps its language placing the burden on the state for
constitutional reasons was more carefully selected and would be
mandated by federal law anyway. If so, the West Virginia rule
permits the defendant to successfully challenge his conviction by
proving the existence of ineffectiveness by a preponderance of the
evidence and if the state then maintains that the ineffectiveness
had no bearing on the result, it must show the harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt 5
Courts which place the burden of proof on the prosecutor
usually argue that it is unfair to require the defendant to prove
prejudice. There may in fact be no evidence of prejudice for the
very reason that counsel has been ineffective.89 Critics of this apThe Eighth Circuit apparently requires the petitioner in a habeas corpus
postconviction proceeding to make a more powerful showing of inadequacy than
would be required on direct appeal. See Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.
1974).
17 203 S.E.2d 445, 461
(W. Va. 1974).
" Id.

P- State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710, 718 (W. Va. 1977), may have clarified the
situation. There, in discussing the effect of the Chapman test as adopted in
Thomas, the court said: "[Wihere the State defends against a claim that a right
guaranteed by our Constitution has been violated, on the basis that the violation
is harmless error, it is incumbent on the State to show that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."
11In United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court held
that two factors justify placing the burden of proof on the prosecutor. First, under
the adversary system the burden is on the government to prove guilt and a rule
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proach argue that it is unfair to penalize the prosecution for actions
over which it had no control. They feel that the burden should be
placed on the person asserting the claim so as to allow a more
equitable sharing of the burden of proofA0 In short, these courts feel
that the defendant's burden should be sufficient to deter frivolous,
time-consuming claims.'
3. Conflict of Interest. In some instances the nature of the
ineffectiveness may make a separate inquiry into actual prejudice
unnecessary. Courts have recognized that there are circumstances
in which the burden will be excused because of the pervasive nature of the prejudice. 2 One of these circumstances arises where the
defense attorney is involved in a conflict of interest. In Holloway
v. Arkansas the United States Supreme Court held that prejudice
will be presumed when a trial court over a timely objection improperly requires joint representation of conflicting interests." Reversal is automatic regardless of any showing of prejudice in such a
case because of the nature of the error. "[T]o assess the impact
of conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an
inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike
most cases, unguided speculation."'"
Holloway v. Arkansas is primarily significant because it represents a major shift from previous treatment of multiple defendants
and attorney conflict of interest. 5 Importantly, however, Holloway
requiring the defendant to show prejudice would improperly shift that burden. It
is no answer to this, according to the court, to say that the defendant has already
had a trial in which the government was put to its proof because the essence of the

complaint is that the incompetency of counsel deprived the defendant of a full
adversarial trial. Secondly, proof of prejudice may be absent from the record precisely because counsel has been ineffective. Id. at 1204. But see Note, Ineffective
Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: Principles for Appellate
Review, 13 COL. J.L. Soc. PRoB. 1, 84 n.268 (1977), for a criticism of this statement.
See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
" See Grano, The Right to Counsel: CollateralIssues Affecting Due Process,

54 MrN. L. REv. 1175, 1251 (1970).
'2 See United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970)
(burden to show prejudice excused when pervasiveness of ineffectiveness makes
prejudice impossible to determine); United States v. DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C.
Cir., Oct. 19, 1976) (opinion following remand) (a substantial violation will be
presumed when counsel's ineffectiveness impairs the defense in a manner that

makes impairment difficult to prove) (reargued May 26, 1977).
93 435 U.S. 475, 487-91 (1978).
11Id. at 491.

Is Previously, in United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60 n.7 (1942), the Supreme
Court had held that denial of independent counsel might be a violation of the sixth
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also contains some substantial discussion of the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel by a court which has avoided developing specific law in that area." The Court relied on language in United
5
States v. Glassee7 and Chapman v. California"
to rebut the argument that courts should affirm convictions in which conflict of
interest is claimed unless the defendant can demonstrate prejudice. Stating that "[tihe mere physical presence of an attorney
does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on
crucial matters,"9 9 the Court placed great emphasis on the peculiar
evil engendered by joint representation of conflicting interests.
When an advocate is compelled to refrain from pursuing crucial
elements in his client's case, a barren record results from which no
court could fairly determine prejudicial error. 1 '
Whether Holloway should be extended beyond its facts is
questionable. The Court carefully limited its holding to issues of
conflicts of interest raised by timely motion in which the trial
judge fails to conduct an inquiry.' ° It may therefore be argued that
the case is sui generis and provides no indication that the Court
would favor automatic reversal under the strict Chapman test in
other ineffectiveness situations. There is, however, broad language
in the decision about the relationship between prejudice and the
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, but had failed to reverse the

conviction of Glasser's codefendant because there was no showing of prejudice.
Since then most courts have required a showing of actual prejudice or conflict by
the defendant seeking reversal. See United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d
Cir. 1976); United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

419 U.S. 1047 (1974); United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.
1973); United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947
(1970); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.

964 (1969).
'

See Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 16 AMi.CaM. L. REv. 67, 76

(1978).
'7 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942): "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too
fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial."
"R 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). Assistance of counsel is among those "constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error."
" 435 U.S. at 490.
'® Id. On the other hand, the dissent would require that the record at least offer
some reasonable inference that conflicting interests hampered a potentially effective defense. Id. at 495.
WIId. at 488-89.
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denial of the right to effective counsel.' In addition, the lack of
record which the Court found so compelling in conflict of interest
situations often exists in other ineffectiveness cases."0 3 Thus crucial
indicators of possible prejudice may be just as lacking when counsel has merely failed to raise certain issues or perform certain tasks
as when he is compelled by external circumstances to refrain from
them. Finally, the standard of proof of conflict under Holloway is
minimal: actual conflict need not be shown."' It is possible then
that courts, looking to the totality of the Holloway rationale, will
be persuaded to follow the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' approach and
decide that whenever ineffectiveness of counsel is proved, it is
conclusively prejudicial. It is more likely, though, that most courts
will limit Holloway to the special nature of its ineffectiveness and
continue to treat prejudice as a separate issue from ineffective05
ness.1
Prior to Holloway, the West Virginia court in Postelwaite v.
Bechtold had condemned joint representation which results in conflict prejudicing a defendant."' The Postelwaite decision differs
significantly from Holloway in several respects. Postelwaite held
that a defendant must always show actual conflict before a court
could reverse on grounds of ineffectiveness. Holloway eases that
burden: where a defendant makes a timely representation of possible conflict, the trial judge must order separate representation
unless the asserted risk of conflict is "too remote to warrant separate counsel."'0 7 In addition, in Holloway counsel had made a
pretrial motion to appoint separate counsel. By contrast, counsel
in Postelwaite had recommended and defendants had acquiesced
in the joint representation as a trial strategy. The West Virginia
court concluded that the defendants had knowingly waived their
right to complain about any actual conflict which might result at
trial. It considered the alleged ineffective advocacy at their trial to
be part of a plan of trial tactics gone awry which the court would
not second-guess. Thus, even though counsel's options were re102
Id. at 489-90.

I For example, the record will not indicate which witness could have been
called or which defenses could have been raised by counsel.
"1 435 U.S. at 488.
105For a discussion advocating that prejudice should be treated as a separate
issue in ineffectiveness cases, see Note, Ineffective Representationas a Basis for
Relief from Convidtion:Principlesfor Appellate Review, 13 COL. J.L. Soc. PROD. 1,
71-87 (1977).
z'212 S.E.2d 69, 76 (W. Va. 1975).
435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978).
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stricted during trial by evidence of conflicting interests between
the defendants, the court would not presume prejudice where the
defendants had voluntarily agreed to the joint representation.'10
Following Postelwaite, in Watson v. Black the West Virginia court
ruled that a judge should hold a hearing whenever it is suggested
to the court that there is a conflict of interest.1' 9 The issue of
conflict may be raised by either the lawyer or the defendant himself.110
In light of the dictates of Postelwaite and Watson, with the
gloss provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Holloway v.
Arkansas, it appears that in West Virginia a trial judge must conduct an inquiry into a pretrial claim of conflict of interest or risk
automatic reversal. Where counsel and defendants have agreed to
joint representation as a strategy, however, later-emerging con'D 212 S.E.2d

at 76.

1' 239 S.E.2d 664, 668 (W. Va. 1977) (although an indigent defendant has a

right to be represented by counsel, he does not have a right to be represented by a
particular lawyer, or to demand a different appointed counsel; there may be cir-

cumstances, however, that would mandate the appointment of new counsel).

M10
Id. Watson did not discuss whether a court may order defendants to be
separately represented despite their wishes to the contrary. See United States v.
Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring):
[Tihere will be cases where the court should require separate counsel to represent certain defendants despite the expressed wishes of such
defendants. Indeed, failure of the trial court to require separate representation may . . . require a new trial, even though the defendants have
expressed a desire to continue with the same counsel. The right to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount
in the proper administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases
take precedence over all other considerations, including the expressed
preference of the defendants concerned and their attorney.
But see United States v. Duklewski, 567 F.2d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 1977), on whether
a defendant may waive his right to conflict-free counsel:
Even though we recognize that the judge was probably prompted by a
becoming desire to protect counsel from possible future embarassment,
his action did not give proper regard to the defendant's rights; and we
are forced to find that counsel's withdrawal was not voluntary and that
in effect the district judge had disqualified the retained counsel for the
defendant without according to the defendant an opportunity to exercise
in an intelligent manner, any right of waiver of such conflict as might
exist in counsel's representation.
See also United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Investigation
Before the February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977);
proposed amendment to FED. R. CRim. P. 44(c); ABA Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function (Approved Draft 1971).
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flicts at trial will be treated as unsuccessful trial tactics in spite of
the apprehension expressed by the Court in Holloway. I"
4. Forfeiture. Effective assistance of counsel is essentially a
postconviction problem and claims are most frequently raised in
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.112 The decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, redefining the doctrine of
exhaustion of state remedies, had broadened the availability of the
federal habeas corpus remedy to state prisoners claiming an involuntary waiver of a constitutional claim."' Recently, however, the
Supreme Court moved to constrict the use of federal habeas corpus
as a means of challenging the fairness of trial proceedings. In
Wainwright v.Sykes the Court held that a failure to enter a timely
objection to a confession obtained in violation of Miranda rights
bars relief on habeas corpus unless there can be shown (1) a cause
for the failure and (2) resulting prejudice."' The Court, however,
did not define the exact meaning of "cause" and "prejudice."" ' A
reading of the separate concurring opinions in Sykes indicates that
ineffectiveness of counsel which has affected the outcome of the
M Since Holloway one federal court has held that a defendant may knowingly
waive any actual or potential conflict of interest. United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d
317, 320 (8th Cir. 1978).
I There are other ways a defendant convicted of a crime can raise the issue.
He may claim ineffectiveness in a motion for a new trial or in a motion to vacate
sentence or judgment. He may also raise his claim on direct appeal from the judgment. When a defendant raises his claim on direct appeal, however, he is disadvantaged by (1) the principle that additional evidence beyond that contained in the
record of the trial cannot be presented, and (2) the practice of appointing the same
counsel from trial to prosecute the appeal. But where new counsel is commonly
appointed on appeal, as in the District of Columbia Circuit, claims of ineffectiveness on direct appeal are likely to be more frequent. See Bazelon, supra note 4, at
27.
In federal court a defendant may raise the issue of ineffectiveness by filing a
motion in the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence imposed.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
For full discussions of the use of habeas corpus as a remedy for ineffectiveness
of counsel see 5 Am. Jun. 2d P.O.F.2d Ineffective Assistance of Counsel § 11 (1975);
Bines, supra note 1 at 939; Waltz, supra note 11, at 290.
1 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
t" 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
5 We leave open for resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the "cause" -and- "prejudice" standard, and note here only that
it is narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963), which would make federal habeas review generally available
to state convicts absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal
constitutional contention.
433 U.S. at 87.
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case may fit the definition of "cause" and "prejudice" which would
remove the effect of a procedural default and thus allow collateral
attack."' These opinions clearly indicate, however, that under the
"cause" and "prejudice" exception most procedural defaults
would be viewed by the Court as tactical decisions left to the
117
discretion of the trial lawyer.

In a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan made
clear that he would be more protective of the defendant and would
not draw the majority's subtle distinctions between simple counsel
error and ineffective assistance of counsel in cases where such error
forfeits habeas review of a constitutional claim. He vigorously
argued that the real question was counsel's competency and that
the ultimate purpose of the majority's restriction on the availability of the federal habeas remedy was to reduce counsel error at
trial. To that end he believed the majority's solution unfairly denied judicial consideration of a defendant's claims "because of
errors made by his attorney which lie outside the power of the...
petitioner to prevent or deter." ' In the wake of Sykes, Justice
Brennan predicted, counsel inadequacy would become the usual
means of attacking convictions based on procedural defaults.
Because of the expanded role for the claim of ineffectiveness
which he foresaw, Justice Brennan then focused on the failure of
the judicial system to deal realistically with the problem of counsel
competency.
[M]ost courts, this one included, traditionally have resisted
any realistic inquiry into the competency of trial counsel. There
is nothing unreasonable, however, in adhering to the proposition that it is the responsibility of a trial lawyer who takes on
the defense of another to be aware of his client's basic legal
rights and of the legitimate rules of the forum in which he
practices his profession. If he should unreasonably permit such
rules to bar the assertion of the colorable constitutional claims
of his client, then his conduct may well fall below the level of
competence that can fairly be expected of him.'
"' Id. at 91-94 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 94-97 (Stevens, J., concurring);
id. at 97-99 (White, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 91 n.14. For similar assumptions about counsel competency see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 553 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 234 n.1 (1973); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 450 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).

433 U.S. at 116.
119
Id. at 117-18.
"
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Although it has not specifically considered the Sykes decision,
West Virginia is apparently in accord with the majority's rationale.
In State v. Grimmer the court held that a defendant who failed to
object at trial to the fact that he had never been formally arraigned
had effectively waived any procedural claim he may have had.'2 ,
Critical to the court's reasoning was its minimizing of counsel's
omission as harmless technical error and its determination that the
defendant had been represented by "learned and effective" counsel.'"' Whether the court intended to relate the prejudicial effect
of counsel's error to the level of counsel's competency is not clear.
It would appear, however, after Grimmer, that if a defendant remains silent at trial and later attempts to raise his counsel's procedural error for the first time on appeal or habeas, he will bear a
heavy burden in overcoming a presumption of waiver where the
court determines that his counsel acted competently.
Wainwright v. Sykes points up the continuing dilemma which
exists today over the proper way to deal with the impact of ineffectiveness claims on final judgments. The general approach of the
courts has been to minimize the impact of counsel inadequacy on
the adversary system by distinguishing mere counsel error (frequently dismissed as trial tactics) and ineffectiveness. 22 As the
dissent in Sykes points out, the integrity of the judicial process
may be risked thereby. Courts cannot maximize the procedural
consequences of counsel error without redefining the concept of
ineffectiveness to reflect more precisely its impact in the realm of
finality of judgments.
V.

CONCLUSION

The task of measuring individual counsel effectiveness is necessarily ad hoc and encompasses many different factual situations.
Although the courts which have developed standards for assessing
attorney competency claim to have provided an objective measurement, their standards are invariably vague and susceptible to
subjective impressions. Clearly, a single objective standard of
effectiveness would eliminate the confusion which presently exists
,' 251 S.E.2d 780, 785 (W. Va. 1979).

,

Id. See Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New

Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REv. 443, 475 (1978) for a discussion of the emerging role of
effectiveness of counsel as an "essential link" in the process of distinguishing an
effective forfeiture of a claim.
' For a discussion of West Virginia's particular treatment of trial tactics see
text accompanying notes 41-49, supra.
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among the courts. The United States Supreme Court, however, has
consistently denied certiorari to cases raising effective assistance
issues,' 2 and has left to the lower courts and professional associations the task of developing the standards which would give content to the concept of effective assistance. 24 Until the Court is
willing to delineate specific defense guidelines and standardize the
procedural aspects surrounding the claim, uniform enforcement of
the constitutional right to effective counsel will not be possible.
Irene M. Keeley
'= In a recent dissent to a denial of certiorari, Mr. Justice White reviewed the
various standards utilized in challenges to competency of counsel and concluded:
The decisions of this Court recognize that the right to counsel is
fundamental to a fair trial ... and, in the last analysis, it is this Court's
responsibility to determine what level of competence satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows that we should attempt to eliminate
disparities in the minimum quality of representation required to be provided to indigent defendants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly
frames an issue that has divided the courts of appeals, the Court shirks
its central responsibility as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the administration of criminal justice under a Constitution such
as ours.
Marzullo v. Maryland, 435 U.S. 1011, 1012-13 (1978).
"I See, e.g., REPORT AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMIrTEE TO

CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL

CoumrS, 79 F.R.D.

187 (1978).
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